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Abstract 
The labour market situation of low-educated people is particularly critical in most advanced 
economies, especially among youngsters and women. Policies aiming to increase their 
employability either try to foster their productivity and/or to decrease their wage cost. Yet, the 
evidence on the misalignment between education-induced productivity gains and corresponding 
wage cost differentials is surprisingly thin, inconclusive and subject to various econometric biases. 
We investigate this issue using rich Belgian linked employer-employee panel data for the period 
1999-2010. Moreover, we provide first evidence on the moderating roles of age, gender and 
industry in the relationship between education, productivity and wage costs. Controlling for 
simultaneity issues, time-invariant workplace characteristics and dynamics in the adjustment 
process of dependent variables, findings support the existence of a ‘wage-compression effect’, i.e. a 
situation in which the distribution of wage costs is more compressed than the education-productivity 
profile. This effect, robust across industries, is found to disappear among older cohorts of workers 
and to be more pronounced among women than men. Overall, findings suggest that particular 
attention should be devoted to the productivity to wage cost ratio of low-educated workers, 
especially when they are young and female, but also to policies favouring gender equality in terms 
of remuneration and career advancement. 
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1. Introduction 
 
A vast literature examines the impact of education on wages (Ashenfelter et al., 1999; Card, 
1999). Empirical results typically document a substantial wage gap between high- and low-
educated workers. Moreover, they show that this gap has been increasing over the last few 
decades (Harmon et al., 2003; Picketty and Saez, 2003). Diversity in individual, job and/or 
firm characteristics accounts for a significant fraction of the educational wage differential. 
However, a substantial wage premium is still recorded for more highly educated workers after 
controlling for observable heterogeneity and other econometric issues such as endogeneity 
(Chevalier, 2011; Dickson and Harmon, 2011; Devereux and Fan, 2011). 
Human capital theory (Becker, 1964) posits that: i) education develops skills that make 
workers more productive, and ii) wage differentials reflect differences in productivity. 
Accordingly, more highly educated workers would earn higher wages ceteris paribus simply 
because they are more productive than their less educated counterparts. This explanation of 
pay inequality has been challenged by empirical and theoretical work on labour markets: 
“Sociologists have long been dissatisfied with [neoclassical and human capital theory], 
particularly with their silence about the many forces that generate a mismatch between 
marginal productivity or skills and wages in the ever-present short run” (Weeden, 2002: 71). 
Indeed, a range of labour market theories hypothesize sources of inequality other than labour 
productivity, such as collective action, labour market institutions or the use of power and 
authority to obtain economic advantages (Berg, 1981; Kalleberg and Sørensen, 1979). 
Although each of these theories on inequality focuses on distinct social processes, they appear 
to have in common that they associate labour market inequality at least implicitly to an 
element  of  ‘unearned’,  or  ‘unjust’  allocation  of  resources  to  dominant  groups.  On the  other  
hand, economists have also developed explanations of differences between productivity and 
wages without abandoning the assumptions of individual rationality and profit-maximizing 
firms. In this literature, productivity-wage gaps are thought to be rational strategies of firms to 
address a range of market distortions (Lazear and Shaw, 2007). 
The abundance of theories on education-driven productivity-wage gaps is not matched by 
a corresponding body of empirical literature. Indeed, very few studies have actually examined 
how the composition of the labour force affects firm productivity (Galindo-Rueda and Haskel, 
2005; Haegeland and Klette, 1999; Haltiwanger et al., 1999; Lebedenski and Vandenberghe, 
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2014; Moretti, 2004).1 Moreover, the evidence on whether education raises productivity and 
wages equally is very thin, inconclusive and subject to various possible econometric biases. 
The endogeneity of education and the presence of firm-level time-invariant unobserved 
heterogeneity are for instance seldom controlled for. Most estimates regarding the education-
productivity nexus and the existence of possible education-driven productivity-wage gaps are 
thus potentially inconsistent. What’s more, to our knowledge, no study has tried to assess 
whether the education-productivity-wage nexus varies across working environments. Yet, 
numerous arguments (notably related to working conditions, adjustment costs, information 
asymmetries, social norms or labour market regulations) suggest that this is probably the case.  
The aim of this paper is threefold. First, we put the relationship between the educational 
composition of the workforce and firm productivity to an updated test, using detailed Belgian 
linked employer-employee panel data for the years 1999-2010. These data offer several 
advantages. The panel covers a large part of the private sector, provides accurate information 
on average productivity (i.e. the average value added per hour worked) and allows us to 
control  for  a  wide  range  of  worker  and  firm  characteristics.  It  also  enables  us  to  address  
important methodological issues, often neglected in other studies, such as firm-level time-
invariant heterogeneity, endogeneity and state dependence of firm productivity. To do so, we 
rely on both the generalized method of moments (GMM) and the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) 
estimators. A second objective is to examine whether education increases productivity and 
wage costs equally (i.e. to extend the analysis to productivity-wage gaps). Finally, our study 
aims to provide first evidence on whether the alignment between productivity and wage costs 
across educational levels depends on the characteristics of workers (i.e. their age and sex) and 
the sector in which they work (i.e. industry vs. services). 
Research questions addressed in this paper are very important for economic policy. The 
labour market situation of low-educated workers is particularly critical in most industrialised 
countries. This is also the case in Belgium (Eurostat, 2014). The unemployment rate in 
Belgium among the low-educated (i.e. people with less than upper secondary education) is 
three times larger than that among tertiary educated workers (16 vs. 4.9 percent in 2013). As 
regards the employment rate, it is found to be more than 40 percentage points lower among 
the former group of workers (37.5 versus 81 percent in 2013). These observations hold for 
                                                             
1 At the macro-level, some studies suggest that education fosters output per worker and income per capita 
(Krueger and Lindahl, 2001; Mankiw et al., 1992). However, the use of cross-country panel data over long 
periods makes the identification of the causal relationship between education and productivity difficult. In 
particular, controlling for reverse causality (i.e. for the fact that countries with higher growth rates invest more in 
education) remains challenging (Lebedinski and Vandenberghe, 2014; Sianesi and Van Reenen, 2003). 
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both genders. Yet, differences in employment rates across educational levels are sharper 
among women than men. Less than 30 percent of low-educated women aged between 15 and 
64 are actually employed in Belgium (compared to around 44 percent of low-educated men). 
Low-educated people are also particularly at risk on the labour market when they are young. 
The unemployment rate among the low-educated aged 15-24 is about 3 times higher than 
among their older (i.e. 25-64 years old) low-educated counterparts (39.8 versus 13.5 percent 
in 2013).2 Various theories, including skilled-biased technological change and competition 
from low-wage countries, have been put forward to explain this phenomenon (Acemoglu, 
2002; Bernard et al., 2006; Biscourp and Kramarz, 2007; Hertveldt and Michel, 2013). A key 
argument here is that low-educated workers are too costly with respect to their added value. 
As a result, firms are willing to substitute low-educated workers by capital, to outsource part 
of their activities to cheap-labour countries and (especially in the case of excess labour 
supply) to hire more educated workers as their productivity to wage cost ratio is more 
favourable. 
Despite the fact that alternative theories (based on tournaments, internal decision-making 
processes of organisations, monopsony or monitoring issues) suggest that low-educated 
workers might actually not be too costly relative to their marginal products (Lazear and 
Rosen, 1981; Bebchuk and Fried, 2003; Manning, 2003; Osterman et al., 2009), most policies 
aiming to increase the employability of low-educated people in the OECD area either try to 
foster the latters’ productivity (e.g. through specific training programmes) and/or to decrease 
their wage cost (e.g. through reduced payroll taxes). Belgium is no exception in this respect. 
Indeed, it is among the highest spenders for active labour market policies in Europe (Eurostat, 
2010) and reductions in employers’ and personnel social security contributions (notably 
targeted on the low-skilled) represent more than 1.5 percent of GDP (Belgian federal 
government, 2012). While these policies are quite standard to improve the labour market 
prospects of low-educated people, their effectiveness remains highly controversial (Heckman 
et al., 1999; Kluwe and Schmidt, 2002; Burggraeve and du Caju, 2003; Cockx et al., 2004; 
Dagsvik et al., 2011; Cahuc and Carcillo, 2012; Huttunen et al., 2013; Konings and 
Vanormelingen, 2014). This is notably due to the fact that the relationship between education, 
wage costs and productivity is still not well understood. In particular, it remains unclear 
whether education-induced productivity gains are well aligned with corresponding wage cost 
                                                             
2 Figures for the OECD area show a very similar pattern (OECD, 2013). For example, the unemployment rate 
among the low-educated is more than two times bigger than among tertiary educated workers (i.e. 12.6 and 4.8 
percent in 2012). Moreover, the employment rate is almost 30 percentage points higher among tertiary educated 
people than among low-educated ones (i.e. 83 and 55.5 percent in 2012). 
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differentials. The objective of this paper is to improve our understanding of these issues with 
a specific focus on workers’ age, sex and sectoral affiliation. 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. A review of the literature regarding 
the relationship between education, wages and productivity is presented in the next section. 
The following two sections, respectively, describe our model, methodology and data set. We 
then analyse the impact of the composition of the workforce in term of education on 
productivity, wages, and productivity-wage gaps across working environments and end with a 
discussion of the results and a conclusion. 
 
2. Review of the literature 
 
2.1. Theoretical background 
 
Many of the theories predicting productivity-wage gaps are either formulated without 
referring to specific categories of workers or focus on gaps based on categories other than 
education, like age or gender. In this section, we show how some of the more prominent 
theories on mismatches between productivity and wages can be adapted to account for 
workers’ educational heterogeneity. 
 
Compensating wage differentials and adjustment costs 
 
A first set of explanations for the existence of a relationship between education, wages and 
productivity  refers  to  compensating  wage  differential  theories,  i.e.  to  human capital  and  the  
hedonic theory of wages.  
According to human capital theory (Becker, 1964), education (as well as training and 
work experience) develops skills that make workers more productive. Moreover, given that 
workers are assumed to be paid at their marginal productivity, this theory suggests that 
education-driven productivity gains will be aligned to education-induced wage differentials. 
Put differently, human capital theory predicts that firm’s profitability is on average not 
affected by the educational composition of the labour force. 
Heterogeneity in working conditions is also likely to influence the relationship between 
education, wages and productivity. Indeed, the hedonic theory of wages (Rosen, 1974) 
highlights that perfect competition mechanisms provide reimbursement for workers 
occupying strenuous jobs (e.g. dangerous jobs, jobs with a heavy workload, an unpleasant 
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environment or a low social status). The underlying intuition is that employers have to 
compensate a greater harshness by a higher wage so that workers’ utility remains unchanged 
and that the hardest jobs get filled. Workers with identical productivity may thus earn 
different wages due to heterogeneity in working conditions. Given that low-educated workers 
are more likely to hold jobs with inferior working conditions and greater insecurity, the 
hedonic theory of wages suggests that the latter, at given productivity, should be paid more 
than their high-educated counterparts. If diversity in working conditions is not (or 
imperfectly) controlled for, empirical results will indicate that low-educated workers are paid 
above their marginal productivity and that firm profits increase with the share of high-
educated workers. 
Labour adjustment costs (i.e. hiring and separation costs) can also affect the education-
productivity-pay nexus. In the dynamic labour demand model, adjustment costs are taken into 
account and amortized over a worker’s average length of service within a firm (Oi, 1962). 
Workers are thus not paid at their current marginal productivity. Indeed, the total present 
value of wages is now equal to the difference between the total present value of marginal 
productivities and adjustment costs. Given that adjustment costs are generally lower for low-
educated workers (Dhyne and Mahy, 2012), this model predicts that the gap between 
productivity and wages is bigger for high-educated workers. 
 
Information asymmetry 
 
For employers willing to manage asymmetric information through incentive practices, 
tournament theory (Lazear and Rosen, 1981) suggests the implementation of a performance-
related  pay  system,  where  the  prize  (a  promotion  or  a  bonus)  is  attributed  to  the  most  
productive worker. This system aims to trigger competition and to encourage workers to 
provide sustained effort. It generates a convex relationship between a worker’s pay and his 
position in the firm’s hierarchy, to the extent that workers at the top of the hierarchy receive 
wages beyond their marginal products. According to tournament theory, “the president of a 
corporation is viewed as the winner of a contest in which he receives the higher prize. His 
wage is settled on not necessarily because it reflects his current productivity as president, but 
rather because it induces that individual and all other individuals to perform appropriately 
when they are in more junior positions” (Lazear and Rosen, 1981: 847). Given that low-
educated workers are generally found at the bottom of corporate hierarchies, tournament 
theory suggests that firm-level profits should increase with the share of low-educated workers. 
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Another strand of the literature uses more sophisticated assumptions about the individual 
utility function of the worker. Hamermesh (1975), for instance, developed a theory in which 
utility depends not only on one’s own, but also on other people’s wages. As a consequence, 
high wage inequality could lead to lower utility and lower effort. Workers may perceive wage 
inequality as ‘unfair’ and decrease their effort accordingly (Akerlof and Yellen, 1988). Hence, 
there is an efficiency argument in paying high-productivity jobs in a firm below and low-
productivity jobs above their marginal products so as to compress the overall wage structure 
(Mahy et al., 2011a,b). If one assumes that low-educated workers are less productive than 
their high-educated counterparts, this theory suggests that firm-level profits decrease with the 
share of low-educated workers. 
 
Social norms, political processes and labour market regulations 
 
The literature on social norms and remuneration has also some relatively straightforward 
implications for the over- or under-payment of low-educated workers with respect to 
productivity. Skott (2005) treats wage norms as endogenous, with past events shaping what 
are  considered  to  be  ‘fair’  wages.  This  creates  a  hysteresis  of  the  wage  structure,  slow  
adjustment to productivity shocks and therefore potential deviations from productivity-based 
pay. Similarly, Doeringer and Piore (1985) view the related concepts of ‘customs’ and 
‘habits’ as important factors in the determination of employment rules in their model of 
internal labour markets. They argue that beside efficiency considerations (employers’ 
interests) and demands for stability and job security (employees’ interests), strong customs 
render changes in pay rules difficult. Given that technological change over the past decades 
appears to be skill/task biased and that low-educated workers are typically less skilled and 
often doing more routine tasks (Autor et al., 1998; Acemoglu, 2002; Goos et al., 2014), the 
hysteresis in social norms could lead to the overpayment of low-educated workers whose 
productivity might have been negatively affected by technological change, and the 
underpayment of high-educated workers whose productivity might have increased. 
Many institutional economists focus on collective processes that complement the analysis 
of market forces. Osterman et al. (2009: 705) affirm that employment rules and systems “are 
the result of a political process in which competing objectives and rationalities play out a 
contest”. The educational wage structure could thus to some extent reflect the competing 
objectives of educational groups and their respective influence on internal decision-making 
processes of organisations. For instance, it seems plausible that any rent generated by the firm 
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is unequally distributed among educational groups reflecting informational and power 
asymmetries between workers of different educational backgrounds (and occupational 
groups). There is a parallel between this idea and the standard analysis of principal agent 
problems: wages of occupations that cannot be controlled effectively by their principals (and 
that are generally occupied by more educated workers) might be higher than predicted by 
standard competitive theory (Bebchuk and Fried, 2003). Monitoring issues and political 
processes thus contribute to explain why high-educated workers may be overpaid relative to 
their respective marginal products. 
Education-induced productivity-pay gaps may also result from labour market regulations, 
such as minimum wages, collective bargaining or unemployment benefits. Minimum wages’ 
first aim is to set a floor at the bottom of the wage distribution in order to protect and sustain 
the earnings of the most vulnerable workers (notably the least educated ones). More precisely, 
they affect wage inequalities by pushing the earnings of low-wage workers upwards and by 
generating spillover effects associated with job losses and ‘wave effects’ on earnings above 
the prevailing minimum (Butcher et al., 2012). Minimum wages may thus lead to the relative 
overpayment of low-educated workers (Cardoso, 2010). A negative association between the 
productivity-pay gap (i.e. profits) and the share of low-educated workers could also derive 
from collective bargaining. In most advanced economies, high-educated workers are less 
likely to be affiliated to a trade union than their low-educated counterparts (Riley, 1997). 
Trade unions may thus be more willing to defend the advantages of the latter, so that wage 
claims (profits) will be bigger (smaller) in firms employing more low-educated workers. Yet, 
collective bargaining may also contribute to protect workers against the monopsonistic power 
of firms (Manning, 2003). Workers with little education are generally quite ‘fragile’ on the 
labour market. As their labour supply curve is on average more inelastic (e.g. due to smaller 
geographical and occupational mobility), they are more likely to accept harder jobs and to be 
paid below their marginal productivity. Accordingly, trade unions and collective bargaining 
(notably on minimum wages) may enable low-educated workers to be paid in line with their 
marginal products, i.e. not to be under-paid. Other labour market regulations, such as 
unemployment benefits, may also affect the productivity-pay gap across educational levels. 
Unemployment benefits are indeed likely to increase the reservation wage, especially for 
workers at the bottom of the earnings distribution, and to exert upward pressure on low wages 
(Cahuc and Zylberberg, 2004). The latter may thus also generate a wage-compression effect. 
However, in case of monopsony, they can also eliminate or at least reduce wage 
discrimination against the most vulnerable workers. 
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2.2. Empirical background 
 
The private returns of schooling have been investigated in hundreds of papers. Empirical 
evidence, based on Mincer (1974) type earnings equations, consistently highlight that more 
educated workers earn higher wages. Estimates of the elasticity between education and wages 
depend on the data used, the underlying assumptions and the estimation techniques (Dickson 
and Harmon, 2011). Methodological debates are thus still vivid. This is especially due to the 
fact that education is a choice variable that depends on other factors (such as family 
background, individual history or innate ability) that affect earnings (Ashenfelter et al., 1999). 
Education is thus likely to be endogenous and controlling for this issue often requires 
identification assumptions that are difficult to verify. According to Card’s (1999) survey of 
the literature, the effect of an additional year of schooling on a worker’s wage stands at 
around  10  percent.  Interestingly,  he  also  shows  that  (differenced)  IV  estimates  are  not  that  
different from those obtained with simple cross-sectional regressions. The meta-analysis 
performed by Ashenfelter et al. (1999) leads to a similar conclusion, namely that variability in 
estimates due to differences in estimation methods are relatively small, although sometimes 
statistically significant. In contrast, Harmon et al. (2003) find that OLS and IV estimates vary 
substantially when based on data from natural experiments. Yet, returns to education for sub-
groups of workers affected by treatments (e.g. changes in compulsory schooling laws) may 
not directly be generalized to all individuals. To sum up, there is little controversy in the 
principle that schooling investments prompt workers’ wages. Moreover, although the exact 
magnitude of the return to education is still debated, it is generally admitted that the latter has 
been increasing since the 1970s and is quite large relative to other types of investments 
(Harmon et al., 2003; Picketty and Saez, 2003; Dickson and Harmon, 2011). 
In line with human capital theory (Becker, 1964), the education-induced wage premium 
is often interpreted as evidence for the fact that more educated workers are more productive. 
The assumption is that workers are paid at their marginal productivity and that education 
improves workers’ skills/productivity. Yet, this interpretation should be done with care. 
Indeed, non-competitive models of wage determination (including collective bargaining, rent-
sharing, discrimination or monopsony) also find support in the empirical literature (e.g. 
Bayard et al., 2003; Manning, 2003; Mortensen, 2003; Rusinek and Rycx, 2011). Hence, 
equally productive workers do not always receive the same wages. Moreover, a surprisingly 
small number of papers have examined how the educational composition of the labour force 
affects productivity at the firm-level (Galindo-Rueda and Haskel, 2005; Haegeland and 
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Klette, 1999; Haltiwanger et al., 1999; Ilmakunnas and Maliranta, 2005; Lebedenski and 
Vandenberghe, 2014; Moretti, 2004; Van Biesebroeck, 2011).3 Much more effort has actually 
been devoted to understand the productivity consequences of other workforce characteristics 
such as age or gender (Bartolucci, 2013; Cardoso et al., 2011; Cataldi et al., 2011, 2012; 
Garnero et al., 2014a; Hellerstein et al., 1999a; Lallemand and Rycx, 2009; van Ours and 
Stoeldraijer, 2011; Vandenberghe, 2011, 2013). Nevertheless, empirical studies (Galindo-
Rueda and Haskel, 2005; Haegeland and Klette, 1999; Haltiwanger et al., 1999b; Lebedenski 
and Vandenberghe, 2014; Moretti, 2004) show that firms employing a larger fraction of high-
educated workers are more productive. They also often suggest that education-induced 
productivity premia are relatively well aligned with earnings or wage cost differentials. 
However, some authors conclude that high-educated workers are paid below their marginal 
productivity (Hellerstein and Neumark, 2004; Ilmakunnas and Maliranta, 2005), while others 
suggest the reverse outcome (Van Biesebroeck, 2011). 
This being said, most studies should be interpreted with great caution as they generally 
neither control for firm-level invariant unobserved heterogeneity nor for the endogeneity of 
education. Put differently, given that most estimates are potentially inconsistent, it is still 
quite difficult to draw clear conclusions. Moreover, to our knowledge, no study has tried to 
assess whether the education-productivity-wage nexus varies across working environments. 
Yet, theoretical arguments reviewed in the previous section of this paper suggest that this is 
likely to be the case. Indeed, factors potentially leading to education-driven productivity-wage 
gaps (e.g. compensating wage differentials, adjustment costs, information asymmetries, social 
norms or labour market regulations) may be more or less relevant depending on the 
characteristics  of  workers  (e.g.  their  age  and  sex)  and  the  sectors  in  which  they  work  (e.g.  
industry or services). As an example, it could be noted that labour market regulations (such as 
minimum wages or unemployment benefits)  essentially affect  the lower end of the earnings 
distribution. As a result, these regulations are more likely to lead to a ‘wage-compression 
effect’ (i.e. a distribution of wage costs by educational groups that is more compressed than 
the education-productivity profile)4 among workers earning lower wages, e.g. younger 
workers (Cardoso, 2010). Along the same lines, given that trade unions are generally found to 
be stronger in the manufacturing industry than in private sector services, a stronger ‘wage-
compression effect’ could be expected in the former sector. As regards workers’ sex, given 
                                                             
3 See footnote 1. 
4 This corresponds to a situation in which low-educated (high-educated) workers are paid above (below) their 
marginal productivity. 
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that upper management jobs are mainly occupied by men, tournament theory (Lazear and 
Rosen, 1981) suggests that high-educated men have a greater likelihood to be paid above their 
marginal productivity. However, given that adjustment costs generally increase with workers’ 
wages  and  that  women  typically  earn  less  than  men,  the  reverse  result  can  also  be  
hypothesized. These examples, among others, suggest that workers’ age, sex and sectoral 
affiliation may have a substantial effect on the (mis)alignment of wages and productivity 
across educational groups. They also illustrate that theoretical predictions are numerous and 
very inconclusive. 
Our paper contributes to this literature by investigating how education affects hourly 
productivity, wage costs and the productivity-wage gap (i.e. profits) at the firm level. 
Moreover, we provide first evidence on how the education-productivity-wage nexus varies 
according to workers’ age, sex and sectoral affiliation. Our empirical approach relies on 
longitudinal linked employer-employee data from the Belgian private sector, uses accurate 
information on average productivity and wage costs within firms (i.e. the average added value 
per worker and the mean hourly wage cost), controls for a large set of covariates and 
implements both dynamic system GMM and LP estimation techniques. These techniques 
control for a range of measurement issues that considerably improve the reliability of 
estimation results compared to existing research. For instance, the consequential issue of 
simultaneity, firm fixed effects and state dependence of firm productivity/pay/profits is rarely 
addressed in previous studies.5 
 
3. Set-up of the analysis 
 
3.1. Model 
 
The test developed in this article is based on the estimation of a value added function and a 
wage cost equation at the firm level. The value added function yields parameter estimates for 
the average marginal products of workers with different educational levels, while the wage 
equation estimates the respective impact of each educational group on the average wage bill 
paid by the firm. Given that both equations are estimated with the same set of firms, 
educational categories and covariates, the parameters for marginal products and wages can be 
compared so that conclusions on educational productivity-wage gaps can be drawn. This 
                                                             
5 For more details see section 3.3. 
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technique was pioneered by Hellerstein et al. (1999a,b) and refined/applied by Cardoso et al. 
(2011), van Ours and Stoeldraijer (2011), Mahlmberg et al. (2013) and Vandenberghe (2013) 
among others. 
Equation (1) is a function linking a range of inputs of firm i to its value added Yi: 
 
),( iii QLKFY                (1) 
 
where Ki represents the firm's capital stock and QLi is  a  quality  of  labour  term.  The  latter  
allows introducing a heterogeneous labour force into the value added function. 
There is an abundant econometric literature on the estimation of relationships as the one 
depicted in Equation (1). In an attempt to reflect more accurately the production process 
inside the firm, specialists in the field have proposed specifications allowing e.g. for 
production inefficiencies or different elasticities of substitution between production factors. 
Since our focus is not on the production process itself, but rather on the comparison between 
productivity and wage costs for a set of workers’ educational levels, we use a standard Cobb-
Douglas version of Equation (1), with substitution elasticities equal to one and the assumption 
that firms operate at the efficiency frontier. This restriction is standard in the corresponding 
literature and appears to be unproblematic as previous firm-level studies have shown that 
productivity coefficients obtained with a Cobb-Douglas production function are robust to 
other functional specifications (see e.g. Hellerstein and Neumark, 2004). We thus rewrite 
equation (1) as follows: 
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where Ai is a constant. The parameters Į and ȕ are the respective marginal productivities of 
each input factor. QLi can be written as: 
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where Li is the total labour force of the firm i and Li,j/Li the proportion of workers with 
educational level j in the total labour force. Substituting Equation (3) into (2) allows for 
different marginal productivities for each of the J educational categories. If for educational 
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group j the parameter șj is bigger (smaller) than unity, then this group has a higher (lower) 
marginal impact on productivity than the reference educational category. If all groups have 
ș’s equal to one, then Equation (3) becomes QLi = Li , i.e. labour is perfectly homogeneous. 
As for the wage cost equation, it can be shown that the average wage bill of firm i can be 
expressed as: 
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where wi,j is the average wage bill of Li,j and j = 0 the reference educational category with the 
wage bill wi,0. Similar to the interpretation of ș in the production function, if the ratio wj/w0 is 
bigger (smaller) than unity, then the marginal impact of educational group j on the average 
wage bill of the firm is higher (lower) compared to the reference educational category. 
Comparing marginal productivities and wage cost differentials across educational groups 
boils down to comparing șj with the corresponding wj/w0. 
 
3.2. Functional specification 
 
We now move from the general form of the value added and wage cost equations (i.e. 
Equations (2) and (4)) to a set of functional specifications. 
The model formed by Equations (5) and (6) is our baseline specification and similar to 
the model in Hellerstein et al. (1999a). The ȕj in Equation (5) is the relative marginal impact 
of educational group j on the average productivity at firm level (note that ȕj corresponds to șj - 
1 in Equation (3)). In Equation (6), ȕj* is the relative marginal impact of educational group j 
on the firm’s average wage bill (ȕj* corresponds to wj/w0 -  1 in Equation (4)).  The terms İi,t 
and İ*i,t represent the error terms. 
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The dependent variable in equation (5) is firm j's hourly value added, obtained by 
dividing the total value added (at factor costs) of firm j in period t by the total number of 
hours worked (taking into account paid overtime hours) that have been declared for the same 
period. The dependent variable in equation (6) is firm j's average wage bill (including payroll 
taxes and variable pay components, such as wage premia for overtime, weekend or night 
work, performance bonuses and other premia). It is obtained by dividing the firm's total wage 
cost by the total number of hours worked. Hence, the dependent variables in the estimated 
equations are firm averages of value added and wage costs (net of social security payroll tax 
cuts) on an hourly basis.  
The main independent variables are the shares of hours worked by each educational 
category in total hours worked, Educationj,i,t. This is a better employment indicator than the 
number of employees in each category since it takes into account educational differences in 
working  time.  We  split  the  employees  of  a  firm  into  three  educational  groups  (i.e.  at  most  
lower secondary education, at most higher secondary education, and tertiary education, 
respectively) and consider the share of workers with at most lower secondary education as our 
reference category. As a robustness test, we also consider more detailed educational groups 
including up to seven categories. 
In addition to the shares of workers by educational level in total hours worked, we also 
include the vector Xi,t.. It contains a set of variables controlling for observable worker, job and 
firm characteristics. More precisely, it includes the share of the workforce within a firm that: 
(i) has at least 10 years of tenure, (ii) is younger than 30 and older than 49 years, respectively, 
(iii) is female, (iv) works part-time, (v) occupies blue-collar jobs, (vi) has a fixed-term 
employment contract, and (vi) is apprentice or under contract with a temporary employment 
agency. Xi,t also comprises the natural logarithm of firm size (i.e. the number of full-time 
equivalent workers)6, the natural logarithm of capital stock per worker7, the level of collective 
wage bargaining (1 dummy), sectoral affiliation (8 dummies), the region where the firm is 
located (2 dummies), and 11 year dummies.8 
                                                             
6 As highlighted in section 4, information on firm size is taken from the ‘Structure of Earnings Survey’, while the 
value added, wage cost and profit per hour variables are constructed from the ‘Structure of Business Survey’. 
This design eliminates the spurious relation issue that might have arisen due to common measurement error, i.e. 
because the number of hours appears (in the denominator) on the left-hand side of Equations (5) to (8) and the 
number of full-time equivalent employees (in the numerator) on the right-hand side. 
7 This is estimated through the ‘perpetual inventory method’ (or PIM, see e.g. OECD (2009) for more details). 
The PIM incorporates the idea that the capital stock results from investment flows and corrects for capital 
depreciation and efficiency losses. Following standard practice, we assume a 5 percent annual rate of 
depreciation. 
8 All independent variables are measured in terms of shares in total work hours. For instance, the fraction of part-
time workers is computed on the basis of the proportion of hours worked by employees working less than 30 
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Estimating equations (5) and (6) allows gauging the effect of education on firm 
productivity and wage costs, but it does not allow testing directly whether the difference 
between the added value and wage cost coefficients for a given educational group is 
statistically significant. A simple method to obtain a test for the significance of productivity-
wage gaps has been proposed by van Ours and Stoeldraijer (2011). This method boils down to 
estimating Equation (7): 
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in which the gap between firm i’s log hourly value added and log hourly wage costs (i.e. the 
log of the ratio between value added and wage costs) is regressed on the same set of 
explanatory variables as in equations (5) and (6). This produces coefficients for the 
educational variables and directly measures the size and significance of their respective 
productivity-pay gaps. 
As a robustness test, we also adopted a more direct approach to examine whether 
potential education-induced productivity gains are aligned with wage cost differentials. To do 
so, we estimate Equation (8): 
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in which firm i’s log gross operating surplus per hour, i.e. the log of the difference between 
the hourly value added and hourly wage costs, is regressed on the same covariates as in 
equation (7). This alternative approach measures the sensitivity of profits (rather than of the 
ratio between value added and wage costs) to shares of workers at different educational levels. 
Estimates of equations (7) and (8) should a priori not lead to very different conclusions. 
However, given that both approaches have been used in the literature (Garnero et al., 2014b; 
Pfeifer and Wagner, 2012; Syverson, 2011) and that no one approach has been demonstrated 
to be superior, results of both equations will be compared and interpreted. 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
hours per week over the total amount of hours worked with the firm. The control variables that have been 
included in our regressions are in line with extant literature (for a review of the set of covariates that should be 
included in this type of analysis see e.g. Göbel and Zwick, 2009). As highlighted by Mahlmberg et al. (2013: 
10): ‘by including a rather broad set of independent variables, we account for heterogeneity among firms, in 
order to mitigate the bias that could be caused by omitted variables’. 
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3.3. Estimation techniques 
 
Equations (5) to (8), have been estimated with four different methods: pooled ordinary least 
squares  (OLS),  a  fixed-effects  (FE)  model,  the  generalized  method  of  moments  (GMM)  
estimator developed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998), and a more 
structural approach suggested by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003, hereafter LP). The OLS 
estimator is based on the cross-section variability between firms and the longitudinal 
variability within firms over time. However, this OLS estimator suffers from a potential 
heterogeneity bias because firm productivity can be related to firm-specific, time-invariant 
characteristics that are not measured in micro-level surveys (e.g. an advantageous location, 
firm-specific assets such as patent ownership, or other firm idiosyncrasies). 
One way to remove unobserved firm characteristics that remain unchanged during the 
observation period is to estimate a FE model. However, neither pooled OLS nor the FE 
estimator address the potential endogeneity of our explanatory variables.9 Yet, as highlighted 
by Gautier et al. (2002: 523), “employers might exploit cyclical downturns to improve the 
average  skill  level  of  their  work  force”.  To  put  it  differently,  there  might  be  some  cyclical  
‘crowding out’, namely a process by which during recessions – because of excess labour 
supply – highly educated workers take the jobs that could be occupied by less educated ones. 
This assumption, supported empirically for certain countries including Belgium (Cockx and 
Dejemeppe, 2002; Dolado et al., 2000), suggests that the share of more educated workers 
within firms may increase as a result of lower labour productivity (and vice versa). To control 
for this endogeneity issue, in addition to temporal persistence in the dependent variable (firm 
productivity, wage costs or profits) and firm fixed unobserved heterogeneity, we estimate 
equations  (5)  to  (8)  with  the  dynamic  system  GMM  (GMM-SYS)  and  LP  estimators,  
respectively. 
The GMM-SYS approach implies to simultaneously estimate a system of two equations 
(respectively in level and in first differences) and rely on internal instruments to control for 
endogeneity. More precisely, educational variables10 are instrumented by their lagged levels 
in the differenced equation and by their lagged differences in the level equation.11 The 
implicit assumption is that changes (the level) in (of) the dependent variable – productivity, 
                                                             
9 Expected biases associated with OLS and the relatively poor performance and shortcomings of the FE 
estimator in the context of firm-level productivity regressions are reviewed in Van Beveren (2012). 
10 By ‘educational variables’, we mean shares of workers by educational level and other input factors. 
11 Bond and Söderbom (2005) provide a review of the literature regarding the identification of production 
functions. The authors notably highlight that adjustment costs of labour and capital can justify the use of lagged 
values (of endogenous variables) as instruments. 
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salary costs or profits – in one period, although possibly correlated with contemporaneous 
variations (levels) in (of) educational variables, are uncorrelated with lagged levels 
(differences) of the latter. Moreover, changes (levels) in (of) educational variables are 
assumed to be reasonably correlated to their past levels (changes). 
One advantage of the system GMM is that time-invariant explanatory variables can be 
included among the regressors, while they typically disappear in difference GMM.12 
Asymptotically, the inclusion of these variables does not affect the estimates of the other 
regressors because instruments in the level equation (i.e. lagged differences of educational 
variables) are expected to be orthogonal to all time-invariant variables (Roodman, 2009). To 
examine the validity of our estimates, we apply Hansen’s (1982) and Arellano-Bond’s (1991) 
tests.  The  first  is  a  test  for  overidentification  which  allows  to  test  the  validity  of  the  
instruments. The second is a test for autocorrelation, where the null hypothesis assumes no 
second order autocorrelation in the first differenced errors. The non-rejection of the two tests 
is required in order to assume that our estimates are reliable. In order to be as parsimonious as 
possible, we choose the model with the minimum number of lags that passes both tests. 
The  adoption  of  a dynamic GMM specification aims to account for the persistency in 
firm-level profits, wage costs and productivity.13 It is also likely to improve the identification 
of the parameters of interest (even though the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable is 
not a central issue in the analysis). Indeed, as illustrated by Bond (2002), the use of a dynamic 
                                                             
12 It is standard in the literature to use dynamic panel data methods such as those proposed by Arellano and Bond 
(1991) to overcome key econometric issues, in particular lag-dependency, firm fixed effects and endogenity of 
input shares. Accordingly, many recent papers rely on dynamic GMM methods to estimate the impact of 
workforce and job characteristics (e.g. age, educational mismatch and employment contracts) on productivity 
and/or labour costs (see e.g. Göbel and Zwick, 2012, 2013; Kampelman and Rycx, 2012a; Mahlberg et al., 2013; 
Mahy et al., 2015; Nielen and Schiersch, 2012, 2014). 
13 From a theoretical perspective, competitive forces should eliminate abnormal profits (McMillan and Wohar, 
2011). The intuition is as follows: if a firm makes excess profits, a competitor should enter the market and offer 
the same good or service at a lower price until profits return to their competitive level. Likewise, firms making 
profits below the competitive rate will disappear as investors move to markets that are more profitable or will 
take actions to increase their profitability. This said, a large literature, dating back to Shepherd (1975) and 
Mueller (1977) and taken further by Geroski and Jacquemin (1988) and McGahan and Porter (1999) and Bou 
and Satorra (2007) among others, suggests that profit persistence is large and inconsistent with the competitive 
framework. More recent papers further show that firms with above (below) normal profits have high (low) 
barriers to entry and exit (McMillan and Wohar, 2011). In light of this so-called ‘persistence of profits 
literature’, there are strong arguments for modelling profits in a dynamic way, i.e. for including the lagged 
dependent variable among covariates in Equations (7) and (8). The assumption of persistent productivity both at 
the industry and firm level also finds some support in the literature (see e.g. Baily et al., 1992; Bartelsman and 
Dhrymes, 1988; Bartelsman and Doms, 2000). Researchers ‘documented, virtually without exception, enormous 
and persistent measured productivity differences across producers, even within narrowly defined industries’ 
(Syverson, 2011: 326). Large parts of these productivity differences are still hard to explain. This implies that 
productivity at time t in a given industry or firm is likely to depend significantly on its lagged value. The 
persistency of wage costs is also highlighted in the literature (see e.g. du Caju et al., 2011, 2012; Fuss and Wintr, 
2009; Heckel et al., 2008; Messina et al., 2010). Wage stickiness is notably the outcome of labour market 
institutions, adjustment costs and efficiency wages’ motives. 
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model is necessary to obtain consistent results when estimating a production function with 
serially correlated productivity shocks and explanatory variables that are correlated to these 
shocks. While serial correlation of productivity shocks may arise if for instance the effects of 
demand shocks are only partially captured by the industry-specific control variables 
(Hempell, 2005), the responsiveness of input factors to productivity shocks may be explained 
by the above-mentioned endogeneity issue. Interestingly, the inclusion of the lagged 
dependent variable in the OLS, fixed-effects and system GMM specifications also provides an 
ad hoc test for the appropriateness of the latter. As outlined by Roodman (2009), this test 
consists in checking whether or not the regression coefficient on the lagged dependent 
variable obtained with system GMM falls between the OLS and fixed effects estimates. 
As an alternative to the GMM-SYS method, Olley and Pakes (1996) have developed a 
consistent semi-parametric estimator. This estimator, particularly well-suited for panels with 
small t and big N, controls for endogeneity by using the employer’s investment decision to 
proxy for unobserved productivity shocks. The intuition is that firms respond to time-varying 
productivity shocks observed by managers (and not by econometricians) through the 
adjustment of their investments. Put differently, profit-maximizing firms react to positive 
(negative) productivity shocks by increasing (decreasing) their output, which requires more 
(less) investments (or intermediate inputs, see below). The OP estimation algorithm relies on 
the assumptions that there is only one unobserved state variable at the firm level (i.e. its 
productivity) and that investments increase strictly with productivity (conditional on the 
values of all state variables). This monotonicity condition implies that any observation with 
zero investment has to be dropped from the data, which generally leads to a sharp decrease in 
sample size and is hence likely to create a sample selection issue. To avoid this drawback, 
Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) use intermediate inputs (i.e. inputs such as energy, raw materials, 
semi-finished goods and services that are typically subtracted from gross output to obtain 
added value) rather than investments as a proxy for productivity shocks. Given that firms 
typically report positive values for intermediate inputs each year, most observations can be 
kept with the LP approach. An additional argument for using intermediate inputs rather than 
investments is that the former may adjust more smoothly to the productivity term than the 
latter, especially if adjustment costs are an important issue. For instance, “if adjustment costs 
lead to kink points in the investment demand function, plants may not respond fully to 
productivity shocks, and some correlation between the regressors and the error term can 
remain” (Petrin et al., 2004: 114). Intermediate inputs would thus provide a better proxy for 
unobserved productivity shocks. In the basic LP model, labour is a fully variable input, 
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whereas capital is a fixed input. Given our focus, the variable inputs in our setup include the 
first moments of workforce characteristics. Assuming that intermediate inputs depend on 
capital and unobservable productivity shocks, this relationship can be solved for the 
productivity term (Ilmakunnas and Ilmakunnas, 2011). When relying on the LP estimation 
algorithm, standard errors are computed using a bootstrap approach taking into account the 
panel structure of the data (Petrin et al., 2004). 
 
4. Data and descriptive statistics 
 
We use a combination of two large datasets covering the years 1999-2010. The first is the 
‘Structure of Earnings Survey’ (SES), carried out by Statistics Belgium. It covers all firms 
that are operating in Belgium, employ more than 10 workers and have economic activities 
within sections C to K of the NACE Rev. 1 nomenclature.14 This survey gathers information 
on firms’ characteristics (e.g. sector, region where the firm is located, number of workers, 
level of collective wage bargaining) as well as information on workers’ characteristics (e.g. 
age, education, tenure, paid hours, sex, occupation, employment contract). However, the SES 
does not provide any financial information. It has thus been merged with a firm-level survey, 
namely the ‘Structure of Business Survey’ (SBS), also carried out by Statistics Belgium. This 
survey provides financial information (e.g. firm-level wage cost, value added and gross 
operating surplus per hour worked). The coverage of the SBS differs from that of the SES in 
that  it  does  not  cover  the  whole  financial  sector  (NACE  J)  but  only  Other  Financial  
Intermediation (NACE 652) and Activities Auxiliary to Financial Intermediation (NACE 67). 
The  merger  of  the  SES  and  SBS  datasets  has  been  carried  out  by  Statistics  Belgium  using  
firms’ social security numbers. 
Information in the SES refers to the month of October of each year, while data in the SBS 
are measured over entire calendar years, i.e. from January to December. To avoid running a 
regression where information on the dependent variable (collected for the entire year) 
precedes the recording of the explanatory variables (collected in October), all explanatory 
variables in equation (1) have been lagged by one year. This way, information on educational 
variables is recorded in October in year t and used to explain firm-level productivity, wage 
costs and profits during the calendar year t+1. The imperfect synchronization of the SBS and 
                                                             
14 It thus covers the following sectors: (i) mining and quarrying (C), (ii) manufacturing (D), (iii) electricity, gas 
and water supply (E), (iv) construction (F), v) wholesale and retail trade, repair of motor vehicles, motorcycles 
and personal and household goods (G), (vi) hotels and restaurants (H), (vii) transport, storage and 
communication (I), (viii) financial intermediation (J), and ix) real estate, renting and business activities (K). 
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SES data might introduce some fuzziness into our estimates since we cannot exclude the 
occurrence of external events influencing firm performance in the intermediate period. This 
concern could only be completely eliminated if we had firm-level information on educational 
variables for the entire calendar year. This being said, even if this information were available, 
there is a compelling argument for using asynchronised information on educational variables: 
it is difficult to conceive how changes in shares of workers by educational level could 
generate immediate effects notably on firm productivity and profits. Potential effects are 
indeed more likely to occur after a certain adjustment period. The slightly asynchronised use 
of SBS and SES is therefore arguably the best option in light of data availability and firm 
performance dynamics. 
As a consequence, our sample contains firms that are observed in at least two consecutive 
years and thus over-represents medium-sized and large firms since the sampling percentages 
for each firm in our dataset increase with the size of the latter.15 Next, we exclude workers 
and firms for which data are missing or inaccurate.16 Finally, we drop firms with fewer than 
10 observations, because the use of average values at the firm level requires a suitable number 
of observations.17 Our final sample covering the period 1999-2010 consists of an unbalanced 
panel of 6,714 firm-year-observations from 1,844 firms. It is representative of all medium-
sized  and  large  firms  in  the  Belgian  private  sector,  with  the  exception  of  large  parts  of  the  
financial sector (NACE J) and the electricity, gas and water supply industry (NACE E). 
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
                                                             
15 The SES is a stratified sample. The stratification criteria refer respectively to the region (NUTS-groups), the 
principal economic activity (NACE-groups) and the size of the firm. The sample size in each stratum depends on 
the size of the firm. Sampling percentages of firms are respectively equal to 10, 50 and 100 percent when the 
number of workers is lower than 50, between 50 and 99, and above 100. Within a firm, sampling percentages of 
employees also depend on size. Sampling percentages of employees reach respectively 100, 50, 25, 14.3 and 10 
percent when the number of workers is lower than 20, between 20 and 50, between 50 and 99, between 100 and 
199, and between 200 and 299. Firms employing 300 workers or more have to report information for an absolute 
number of employees. This number ranges between 30 (for firms with between 300 and 349 workers) and 200 
(for firms with 12,000 workers or more). To guarantee that firms report information on a representative sample 
of  their  workers,  they  are  asked  to  follow  a  specific  procedure.  First,  they  have  to  rank  their  employees  in  
alphabetical order. Next, Statistics Belgium gives them a random letter (e.g. the letter O) from which they have 
to start when reporting information on their employees (following the alphabetical order of workers’ names in 
their list). If they reach the letter Z and still have to provide information on some of their employees, they have 
to continue from the letter A in their list. Moreover, firms that employ different categories of workers, namely 
managers, blue- and/or white-collar workers, have to set up a separate alphabetical list for each of these 
categories and to report information on a number of workers in these different groups that is proportional to their 
share in the firm’s total employment. For example, a firm with 300 employees (namely, 60 managers, 180 white-
collar workers and 60 blue-collar workers) will have to report information on 30 workers (namely, 6 managers, 
18 white-collar workers and 6 blue-collar workers). For more details see Demunter (2000). 
16 For instance, we eliminate a (very small) number of firms for which the recorded value added was negative. 
17 This restriction is unlikely to affect our results as it leads to a very small drop in sample size. The average 
number of observations per firm in each year is equal to 37 in our final sample. 
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Descriptive statistics of selected variables are presented in Table 1. We observe that firms 
have a mean value added per hour worked of 66.19 EUR and that workers’ mean hourly wage 
cost stands at 33.34 EUR.18 Average hourly profits (i.e. gross operating surplus) are equal to 
32.85 EUR. As regards the educational composition of the labour force, we find that the share 
of workers with at most lower secondary education stands at around 30 percent, the fraction 
of workers with higher secondary educational attainment reaches approximately 42 percent, 
and about 28 percent of employees have a degree of tertiary education. 
Employees in our sample are essentially concentrated in the manufacturing industry (58 
percent),  wholesale  and  retail  trade,  repair  of  motor  vehicles,  motorcycles  and  personal  and  
household goods (12 percent), construction (10 percent), real estate, renting and business 
activities (10 percent), and transport, storage and communication (6 percent). Moreover, firms 
employ on average 26 percent of women, 62 percent of prime-age workers (i.e. workers aged 
between 30 and 49 years), 40 percent of employees with less than ten years of tenure, 53 
percent of blue-collar workers, 11 percent of part-time workers, and 3 percent of workers with 
a fixed-term employment contract. Also noteworthy is that 57 percent workers are employed 
in Flanders, 28 percent in Wallonia and 15 percent in Brussels. Finally, as regards collective 
bargaining, Table 1 shows that 32 percent of workers are covered by a firm-level collective 
agreement (in addition to an industry-level agreement). 
 
5. Results 
 
5.1. Benchmark estimates 
 
Given above mentioned econometric issues associated with pooled OLS and FE estimates, we 
directly report findings based on the dynamic GMM-SYS and LP estimators.19 Table 2 shows 
the impact of shares of workers by level of education on hourly productivity, wage costs and 
productivity-pay gaps20 at the firm level. Workers have been split in three educational groups 
according to whether they had: i) at most lower secondary education (low-educated workers), 
ii) an upper secondary educational attainment (middle-educated workers) and iii) at least an 
                                                             
18 All variables measured in monetary terms have been deflated to constant prices of 2004 by the consumer price 
index taken from Statistics Belgium.  
19 OLS estimates (using respectively 3 and 7 educational categories) are reported in Appendices 1 and 2. 
20 As noted in section 3.2, this variable is measured respectively by: a) the value added-wage cost gap (i.e. the 
difference between log hourly value added and log wage costs) and b) log profits (i.e. the log of the difference 
between value added and wage costs). 
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undergraduate degree (high-educated workers). The share of low-educated workers serves as 
reference category. 
 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
GMM-SYS estimates are reported in columns (1) to (4).21 To examine their reliability, we 
first apply the Hansen and Arellano-Bond tests. For all regressions, they do not reject 
respectively the null hypotheses of valid instruments22 and of no second order auto-correlation 
in the first differenced errors. Results in column (1) indicate that middle- and high-educated 
workers are significantly more productive than low-educated workers. They also show23 that 
the productivity of middle-educated workers is significantly smaller than that of high-
educated workers. The regression coefficient associated with the share of middle-educated 
workers is equal to 0.054. This means that if the fraction of middle-educated workers within a 
firm increases by 10 percentage points (and is compensated by a proportional decrease in the 
share of low-educated workers), mean hourly productivity rises on average by 0.54 percent 
(i.e. 0.054*0.10 = 0.0054 = 0.54 percent). Similarly, estimates suggest that increasing the 
share of high-educated workers by 10 percentage points at the expense of low-educated 
(middle-educated) workers increases firm hourly productivity on average by 1.33 percent 
(0.79 percent). LP results, reported in column (5), confirm that workers’ educational 
attainment has a significant positive influence on firm-level productivity. Estimates indeed 
suggest that hourly value added rises on average by respectively 1.28 and 0.19 percent 
following a 10 percentage points increase in the incidence of high- and middle-educated 
workers  (at  the  expense  of  the  reference  educational  group).  They  also  indicate  that  
productivity grows on average by 1.09 percent if the share of high-educated workers increases 
by 10 percentage points and is compensated by a proportional decrease in the fraction of 
middle-educated workers. 
Turning to the relationship between education and wage costs, results show (see column 
(2)) that a 10 percentage points rise in the share of middle-educated (high-educated) workers, 
at the expense of low-educated workers, increases mean hourly wage costs on average by 0.27 
                                                             
21 Note that lagged dependent variables are always found to be highly significant in our regressions. In line with 
extant literature (see footnote 13), they confirm that productivity, wage costs and profitability are highly 
persistent at the firm level. Moreover, GMM coefficients on lagged dependent variables fall systematically 
between the OLS and FE estimates (available on request). As highlighted by Roodman (2009), this result 
supports the appropriateness of our dynamic GMM-SYS specification. 
22 First and second lags of explanatory variables (except time dummies) are used as instruments. 
23 On the basis of a Chi-squared test for equality of regression coefficients. 
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percent (1.45 percent). Moreover, they suggest that wage costs rise on average by 1.18 
percent if the share of high-educated workers is increased by 10 percentage points and 
compensated by a comparable decrease in the incidence of middle-educated workers. 
Findings thus support the existence of a significant upward-sloping relation between 
education and wage costs. 
In order to determine whether marginal wage costs of different educational groups are in 
line with corresponding marginal productivities, we re-estimated our benchmark equation 
using as dependent variable the value added-wage cost gap. Results, reported in column (3) of 
Table 2, suggest that firm rents increase when low-educated workers are substituted by high-
educated ones. Indeed, estimates show that the productivity-pay gap rises on average by 0.55 
percent following a 10 percentage points increase in the share of high-educated workers (at 
the expense of low-educated ones). The additional value generated by high-educated workers 
with respect to their low-educated co-workers is thus found to exceed their wage cost 
differential. In sum, findings in column (3) suggest that high-educated workers are under-paid 
with respect to their low-educated counterparts (and vice versa). Our robustness test, using log 
profits as dependent variable, confirms this conclusion. Indeed, estimates in column (4) show 
that high-educated workers are significantly more profitable than their middle- and low-
educated co-workers.24,25 
To fine-tune our understanding of the education-productivity-pay nexus, we re-estimated 
our benchmark specification using seven rather than three educational categories.26 While the 
inclusion of additional educational variables is likely to increase the standard errors of our 
estimates (as the share of observations within each educational group decreases), results 
reported in Appendix 3 actually support and refine our conclusions. Indeed, they show a 
significant upward-sloping profile between education and wage costs, on the one hand, and 
                                                             
24 The exclusion of firm size among covariates does not affect our conclusions (results available on request). 
25 Note that regression coefficients obtained through a dynamic specification correspond to short-run effects. To 
obtain the long-run impact of changes in educational shares on productivity, wage costs and profits, Koyck 
(1954) has shown that estimates reported in Table 2 should be divided by 1 minus the coefficient associated to 
the lagged dependent variable. Applying this transformation to our benchmark results, we find that elasticities 
are between 2 and 5 times bigger in the long run than in the short run. For instance, according to GMM estimates 
(see column (1)), we find that increasing the share of higher educated workers by 10 percentage points (at the 
detriment of low-educated workers) increases hourly productivity on average by 3,88 percent (1,33 percent) in 
the long run (short run). Similarly, estimates (in column (2)) suggest that hourly wage costs rise on average by 
2,62 percent (1,45 percent) in the long run (short run) if the fraction of high-educated workers within a firm 
increases by 10 percentage points (and is compensated by a proportional decrease in the share of low-educated 
workers). 
26 We differentiated workers according to whether they had: i) at most primary education, ii) lower or upper 
secondary education, iii) a Bachelor’s or equivalent degree, and iv) at least a Master’s or equivalent degree. In 
comparison to our benchmark model, this specification focuses on very low-educated workers and distinguishes 
between workers with first- and advanced-level tertiary education. 
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education and productivity, on the other. They also indicate (see estimates in columns (3) and 
(4)) that low-educated workers tend to be over-paid with respect to other educational groups. 
Decreasing their share at the benefit of more educated groups of employees appears indeed to 
be beneficial for firms’ profitability. Findings thus corroborate the hypothesis that the 
distribution of wage costs across educational groups is more compressed than the education-
productivity profile. More precisely, they support the existence of a ‘wage-compression 
effect’ according to which the substitution of low- by high-educated workers increases 
employer rents (and vice versa).27 
 
5.2. Estimates across industries and groups of workers 
 
The education-productivity-pay nexus is likely to vary across working environments. Various 
theoretical arguments (reviewed in Section 2) suggest in particular that this nexus may depend 
on workers’ age, sex and sectoral affiliation. Given the importance of this issue and the lack 
of empirical results, this section examines these interaction effects in more detail. 
 
Does workers’ age matter? 
 
We first focus on the potential impact of workers’ age. To do so, we re-estimated equations 
(5) to (8), including the education and age shares variables in interaction. More precisely, we 
computed shares of hours worked respectively by young and older workers of different 
educational groups within firms and estimated their effects on productivity, wage costs and 
productivity-pay gaps. In order to guarantee that the number of observations in each 
education-age group was sufficiently large (i.e. to maximize the robustness of our estimates), 
we fixed the threshold separating young from older workers at 40 years.28 Next, following our 
baseline specification, we split young and older workers in three educational groups. We thus 
differentiated workers according to whether they were: i) low-educated (i.e. had at most lower 
secondary education), ii) middle-educated (i.e. had upper secondary educational attainment), 
or iii) high-educated (i.e. had at least an undergraduate degree). The share of young low-
educated workers has been used as reference category. 
                                                             
27 Note that results (available on request) based on static GMM-SYS and LP estimators leave our conclusions 
unaffected. Yet, as expected (see footnote 25), the size of regression coefficients is found to be larger than in 
dynamic specifications. 
28 As can be seen from columns (1) to (3) of Appendix 4, this age limit generates a quite balanced distribution of 
observations across education-age groups. Results based respectively on the 30 and 50 years threshold (available 
on request) show somewhat larger standard errors. However, they corroborate our conclusions. 
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[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
Results are reported in Table 3. GMM-SYS and LP estimates show (on the basis of Chi-
squared statistics testing for the equality of regressions coefficients) that older workers’ 
educational level has a significant positive impact on both productivity and wage costs.29 
They also suggest that education-driven productivity gains among older workers are in line 
with wage cost differentials. Indeed, older workers’ educational level is not found to affect the 
productivity-pay gap (i.e. neither the value added-wage cost gap, nor log profits). Estimates 
among young workers are somewhat different. On the one hand, they confirm the existence of 
a positive impact of educational credentials on wage costs and value added. More precisely, 
they show that young high-educated workers are more productive and costly than young low- 
and middle-educated workers. On the other hand, they highlight that educational credentials 
among young workers have a stronger impact on productivity than on wage costs. Results 
indicate that firms’ rents (measured either through the value-added/wage cost gap or through 
log profits) rise when young low-educated workers are replaced by young high-educated 
workers (and vice versa). 
As a sensitivity test, we re-estimated our model using seven rather than three educational 
categories and kept the threshold to separate young from older workers at 40 years. 
Regression results, reported in Appendix 5, support previous findings according to which 
education increases productivity and wage costs both among young and older workers. They 
also suggest that the under-payment (over-payment) of high-educated (low-educated) workers 
disappears among older cohorts of employees (see column (3) to (5)). In sum, it appears that 
the existence of a ‘wage-compression effect’ is essentially verified among young workers. For 
older workers, estimates indicate that the distribution of wage costs across educational groups 
is well aligned with workers’ educational productivity profile. 
 
Does workers’ sex matter? 
 
In order to examine whether the education-productivity-pay nexus depends on workers’ sex, 
we re-estimated equations (5) to (8), including shares of hours worked respectively by female 
and male workers with different educational attainments within firms. In line with our 
baseline specification, we first focused on low-, middle- and high-educated workers. GMM-
                                                             
29 The positive relationship between older workers’ educational attainment and firm productivity is only 
significant at the 15 percent probability level in the GMM-SYS specification. 
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SYS and LP estimates,  reported in Table 4,  show that women and men’s education exerts a 
significant positive impact on wage costs and productivity. For male workers, we also find 
that education-driven productivity gains do not deviate significantly from wage costs 
differentials (see columns (3) and (4)). In contrast, it appears that productivity is more 
sensitive  to  women’s  level  of  education  than  wage  costs.  More  precisely,  results  show  that  
firms boost their rents (i.e. their value-added wage cost gap and log profits) if they substitute 
low- or middle-educated female workers by high-educated ones. Tertiary educated women are 
thus found to be underpaid with respect to their same-sex co-workers that are less educated 
(and vice versa). No such discrepancy is found among male workers. 
 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 
As  a  robustness  test,  we  re-estimated  our  model  considering  a  larger  number  of  
educational categories (seven instead of three) in interaction with workers’ sex. Results, 
reported in Appendix 6, still support the hypothesis that high-educated workers, be they 
women or men, are more productive and costly than their same-sex lower educated co-
workers. As regards potential discrepancies, Chi-squared statistics for equality of regression 
coefficients again suggest that firm-level rents (i.e. measured both through the value added-
wage cost gap or log profits) increase significantly when replacing low-educated female 
workers by more educated ones. Estimates for male workers are somewhat different than 
those obtained with our more parsimonious specification (i.e. using three educational 
categories). Indeed, while results based on the value added-wage cost gap remain 
insignificant,  those  based  on  log  profits  now  suggest  that  male  workers  with  at  least  a  
Masters’ or equivalent degree are more profitable than their same-sex co-workers that did not 
study beyond secondary school. 
In sum, results clearly indicate that the level of education of women and men has a 
significant positive effect on productivity and wage costs. Moreover, although findings are 
more clear-cut and pronounced for women than for men, they suggest that high-educated 
workers of both sexes generate employer rents. Put differently, we find that education-
induced productivity gains outweigh wage costs differentials for women and (to a lesser 
extent) for men.30 
                                                             
30 Note that men and women have approximately the same age in our sample (respectively, 39.5 and 37.6 years 
with a standard deviation equal to 10.4 and 10.1). The fact that our results are significantly more pronounced for 
women than for men does hence not appear to derive from differences in the latter’s age. 
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Does workers’ sectoral affiliation matter? 
 
To investigate whether our results are sensitive to workers’ sectoral affiliation, we re-
estimated equations (5) to (8) separately for industry and services.31 GMM-SYS and LP 
estimates, considering three educational groups (i.e. low-, middle- and high-educated 
workers), are reported in Table 5. They show the existence of significant upward-sloping 
education-productivity and education-pay profiles in both sectors of activity. Regarding 
potential discrepancies, estimates suggest that the additional value added generated by high-
educated workers exceeds their wage cost differential in both sectors. Yet, considering results 
reported in columns (5) to (8), it is difficult to determine whether the ‘wage-compression 
effect’ is more pronounced in industry or services as the relative size of point estimates vary 
across specifications. 
 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
 
This exercise has been replicated using seven educational categories. Estimates, based on 
this alternative specification, are reported in Appendix 7. They corroborate previous findings. 
Indeed, for both sectors, they highlight that: a) workers’ educational credentials raise 
productivity and wage costs, and b) high-educated workers are underpaid (i.e. increase firm 
profits) with respect to their low-educated counterparts. Furthermore, it is still unclear in 
which sector the magnitude of this ‘wage-compression effect’ is greatest. 
 
Discussion and conclusion 
 
This paper estimates the impact of education on hourly productivity, wage costs and profits 
(i.e. the gap between productivity and wage costs) at the firm level. It significantly contributes 
to the existing literature as it is one of the first to: (1) use a large representative data set (i.e. 
Belgian linked employer-employee panel data covering most private-sector firms over the 
period 1999-2010), (2) address important methodological issues such as firm-level fixed 
effects, endogeneity and state dependence of firm productivity/pay/profits, and (3) examine 
whether education increases productivity and wage costs equally (i.e. to extend the analysis to 
                                                             
31 Industry sectors refer to NACE codes C (Mining and quarrying), D (Manufacturing), E (Electricity, gas and 
water supply) and F (Construction). Services sectors include NACE codes G (Wholesale and retail trade; repair 
of motor vehicles, motorcycles and household goods), H (Hotels and restaurants), I (Transport, storage and 
communication), J (Financial intermediation) and K (Real estate, renting and business activities). 
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wage costs and profits). It also adds to previous research by providing first evidence on 
whether the alignment between productivity and wage costs across educational levels depends 
on  workers’  characteristics  (i.e.  their  age  and  sex)  and  the  sectors  in  which  they  work  (i.e.  
industry vs. services). 
Findings, based on the generalized method of moments (GMM) and Levinsohn and Petrin 
(2003) estimators, show a robust upward-sloping profile between education and wage costs, 
on the one hand, and education and productivity, on the other. They also systematically 
highlight that educational credentials have a stronger impact on productivity than on wage 
costs. Firms’ profitability is indeed found to rise when lower educated workers are substituted 
by higher educated ones (and vice versa). Estimates thus support the existence of a ‘wage-
compression  effect’,  i.e.  a  situation  in  which  the  distribution  of  wage  costs  is  more  
compressed than workers’ education-productivity profile. More precisely, they suggest that 
hourly profits increase on average by 6,2 percent (3,4 percent) in the long run (short run) if 
the fraction of high-educated workers within a firm increases by 10 percentage points (and is 
compensated by a proportional decrease in the share of low-educated workers). Yet, the size 
of this effect is found to depend on the characteristics of workers (i.e. their age and gender). 
The misalignment between education-driven productivity gains and wage cost differentials 
appears to be essentially verified among young workers. Put differently, results suggest that 
high-educated (low-educated) workers are no longer under-paid (over-paid) when they 
become older. As regards gender, findings are more clear-cut and pronounced for women than 
for men. This said, for both sexes, they suggest that firms’ profitability rises following an 
increase in the share of high-educated workers. Finally, results suggest that the ‘wage-
compression effect’ is not sector-specific. Yet, it remains unclear whether this effect is more 
pronounced in industry or in services. 
How can these findings be interpreted? Results from our baseline specification showing 
the existence of a ‘wage-compression effect’ partially back up the predictions of human 
capital theory. On the one hand, they corroborate the idea that education develops skills that 
make workers more productive and that wages reflect differences in productivity. On the 
other, they do not support the hypothesis that education-driven productivity gains are well 
aligned with wage differentials. Our findings are also not in line with theories (based on 
tournaments, internal decision-making processes of organisations or monitoring issues) 
suggesting that high-educated workers are overpaid relative to their respective marginal 
products. Estimates are actually more compatible with the literature on social norms and the 
hysteresis of the wage structure, fairness theories and arguments according to which labour 
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market regulations (such as minimum wages, collective bargaining and unemployment 
benefits) increase the reservation wage, especially for workers at the bottom of the wage 
distribution, and reduce wage inequalities by pushing earnings of low-wage workers upwards. 
We may not exclude that compensating wage differentials may also contribute to explain why 
low-educated workers appear to be overpaid. Yet, given the excess of low-educated labour 
supply (which reduces firms’ incentives to compensate potentially less attractive working 
conditions by higher wages) and the large number of covariates already included in our set-
up, the explanatory power of this argument should probably not be over-stated. An 
explanation based on differences in adjustment costs between high- and low-educated workers 
is also likely to be less relevant as our focus is on wage costs (which encompass all personnel 
expenses) rather than on wages. 
Results according to workers’ age can be understood through additional hypothesis 
testing. Estimates, based on our benchmark regression (see Table 4), suggest that the 
education-driven wage cost differential is smaller among young workers than among older 
workers (z-statistic = -2.48 and p-value = 0.01), while the contribution of education to firm’s 
value added is not found to be statistically different across age groups (z-statistics = -0.58 / 
0.12 and p-values = 0.56 / 0.90 with GMM-SYS / LP estimators).32,33 The observation that the 
wage cost differential between high- and low-educated workers increases with workers’ age 
can be explained by the fact that white-collar workers in Belgium are much more likely to be 
paid according to seniority than their blue-collar counterparts (which are typically less 
educated) and that seniority-pay profiles are generally much steeper for high- than low-
educated workers. A complementary explanation is that labour market institutions (such as 
unemployment benefits, minimum wages and trade unions) essentially affect the lower end of 
the wage distribution. Hence, they are more likely to compress the wage cost differential 
between low- and high-educated workers when they are young. Overall, results thus suggest 
that high-educated (low-educated) workers are no longer under-paid (over-paid) when they 
become older because their wage cost to productivity ratio increases at a faster (slower) pace 
during their career than that of low-educated (high-educated) workers. 
                                                             
32 These results are obtained with the ‘lincom’ command in STATA, after estimating the same regressions as in 
Table 4 but using as reference category ‘young middle-educated workers’ (i.e YE34). The exact syntax is as 
follows: lincom YE567 – YE12 – OE567 + OE12. 
33 We do not reject the hypothesis that the education-driven productivity differential may decrease among older 
cohorts of workers, notably among 50+ workers. Yet, it is difficult to provide consistent evidence on this as the 
number of observations within each education-age group decreases quite substantially when moving the age 
threshold from 40 to 50 years. 
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Estimates by gender suggest that the over-payment (under-payment) of low-educated 
(high-educated) workers is more pronounced among women than men. This finding may be 
explained by the fact that women are over-represented among low-wage earners and are thus 
more likely to have their working conditions influenced by labour market regulations (such as 
minimum wages, collective bargaining and unemployment benefits). However, the stronger 
wage-compression effect among women might also be explained by a glass-ceiling effect, i.e. 
the fact that women face invisible but real barriers preventing them from obtaining higher-
level positions (Christophides et al., 2013). Indeed, results of Kampelman and Rycx (2012b) 
show that the occupation-pay profile in Belgian is steeper than the occupation-productivity 
profile. Accordingly, the fact that women are less likely to hold jobs at the upper rungs of the 
corporate ladder should ceteris paribus have a stronger detrimental effect on their pay than on 
their productivity. Our finding that high-educated women are relatively more underpaid than 
their male counterparts could thus be explained by the fact that women have a lower 
likelihood to be promoted to high-ranking positions. A complementary argument, provided by 
Card et al. (2013: 1), is that high-educated women, in a given occupation, “are less likely to 
initiate wage bargaining with their employer and are (often) less effective negotiators than 
men”. These interpretations echo the estimates of Garnero et al. (2014b). The latter show that 
women generate employer rents in the Belgian private sector and that these rents derive from 
the fact that women earn less than men at any given level of productivity. 
To sum up, our results show that firms located in Belgium (operating both in industry and 
services) face financial disincentives to employing low-educated workers, especially when 
they are young. We indeed find that firms employing a larger share of young low-educated 
workers tend to be less profitable. Policies aiming to improve the labour market prospects of 
young low-educated workers should thus try to boost their productivity and/or to decrease 
their wage cost. A substantial number of policies (i.e. training programmes, wage subsidies, 
reductions of social security contributions) are already implemented in Belgium to reach this 
goal. Yet, our findings suggest that these efforts should be continued and intensified 
(alongside policies fostering total employment). Furthermore, results show that the wage-
compression effect is somewhat more pronounced among women than men. This finding 
suggests that particular attention should be devoted to the productivity to wage cost ratio of 
low-educated women but also to policies favouring gender equality in terms of remuneration 
and career advancement.  
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics at the firm level (1999-2010) 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. 
Value added per hour (€a) 66.19 526.00 
ln(value added per hour) 3.85 0.54 
Wage cost per hour (€a) 33.34 19.62 
ln(wage cost per hour) 3.44 0.33 
Gross profit per hour (€a), i.e. value added per hour - wage cost per hour 32.85 524.56 
ln(gross profit per hour), i.e. ln(value added per hour - wage cost per hour) 2.41 1.21 
Value added-wage cost gap, i.e. ln(value added per hour) - ln(wage cost per hour) 0.41 0.37 
Share of low-educated workers (E12): 0.298 0.295 
- Primary education (E1) 0.073 0.155 
- Lower secondary education (E2) 0.225 0.262 
Share of middle-educated workers (E34): 0.426 0.268 
- Upper general secondary education (E3) 0.208 0.242 
- Upper technical or professional secondary education (E4) 0.219 0.251 
Share of high-educated workers (E567): 0.276 0.251 
- Bachelor’s or equivalent level (E5) 0.157 0.157 
- Master’s or equivalent level (E6) 0.112 0.147 
- Post-Master’ education or PhD (E7) 0.006 0.031 
Workers with 10 years of tenure or more (%) 0.40 0.23 
Share of workers < 30 years 0.21 0.13 
Share of workers > 49 years 0.17 0.12 
Women (%) 0.26 0.23 
Part-time (less than 30 hours per week, %) 0.11 0.13 
Blue-collar workers (%) 0.53 0.33 
Fixed-term employment contacts (%) 0.03 0.08 
Apprentices (%) 0.00 0.01 
Temporary agency workers (%) 0.00 0.04 
Mining and quarrying (C) 0.01 0.09 
Manufacturing (D) 0.58 0.49 
Electricity, gas and water supply (E) 0.00 0.06 
Construction (F) 0.10 0.30 
Wholesale and retail trade, repair of motor vehicles,  
motorcycles and personal and household goods (G) 0.12 0.33 
Hotels and restaurant (H) 0.01 0.12 
Transport, storage and communication (I) 0.06 0.23 
Financial intermediation (J) 0.02 0.13 
Real estate, renting and business activities (K) 0.10 0.30 
Firm-level collective agreement (%) 0.32 0.46 
Brussels 0.15 0.34 
Flanders 0.57 0.48 
Wallonia 0.28 0.43 
Capital stock (€a) 236,013 2,095,986 
Number of observations 6,714 
Number of firms 1,844 
a At 2004 constant prices. Own calculations based on SES-SBS data. 
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